SUMMARY. Since the first H7N9 human case in Shanghai, February 19, 2013, the emerging avian-origin H7N9 influenza A virus has become an epizootic virus in China, posing a potential pandemic threat to public health. From April 2 to April 28, 2013, some 422 oral-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs were collected from birds and environmental surfaces at five live poultry markets (LPMs) and 13 backyard poultry farms (BPFs) across three cities, Wuxi, Suzhou, and Nanjing, in the Yangtze Delta region. In total 22 isolates were recovered, and six were subtyped as H7N9, nine as H9N2, four as H7N9/H9N2, and three unsubtyped influenza A viruses. Genomic sequences showed that the HA and NA genes of the H7N9 viruses were similar to those of the H7N9 human isolates, as well as other avian-origin H7N9 isolates in the region, but the PB1, PA, NP, and MP genes of the sequenced viruses were more diverse. Among the four H7N9/H9N2 mixed infections, three were from LPM, whereas the other one was from the ducks at one BPF, which were H7N9 negative in serologic analyses. A survey of the bird trading records of the LPMs and BPFs indicates that trading was a likely route for virus transmission across these regions. Our results suggested that better biosecurity and more effective vaccination should be implemented in backyard farms, in addition to biosecurity management in LPMs.
Influenza A virus is a segmented, negative strand of RNA virus. Migratory waterfowl, especially Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, are proposed as the reservoirs for influenza A viruses (20). They maintain a large influenza virus genetic pool, which contributes to the appearance of new strains in humans, lower mammals, and other birds. Backyard poultry has been shown to be one of the sites for transmission of virus from wild birds to domestic poultry, and even to humans (1, 10, 22) .
On February 19, 2013, a novel H7N9 low pathogenic avian influenza virus was reported to cause a fatal human case in Shanghai (3, 21) . Since then, this virus has caused at least 588 laboratory confirmed human cases (http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_ interface/influenza_h7n9/en/). This virus has been widely distributed in domestic poultry, especially in birds in live poultry markets (LPMs). A modeling study suggested that the density of a live poultry market is an important predictor of H7N9 infection risk in markets I Corresponding authors. E-mail: muziyin08@163.com, wan@cvm.msstate. edu where this virus is circulating (4) . Genetic analyses showed that the HA and NA genes were derived from viruses in migratory waterfowl and six other internal genes from the influenza viruses, most likely H9N2, in domestic poultry (3) . These viruses have become epizootic in eastern and southeastern China and evolved into multiple regionally distinct lineages with different reassortant genotypes (12, 13) . It is still unclear whether these diverse H7N9 genes were multiple introductions from wild birds or these reassortants were generated in LPMs or domestic poultry farms. Nevertheless, the details on the emergence of the H7N9 virus were not clear, especially during earlier stages of H7N9 outbreaks.
The goal of this study is to assess the role of backyard birds in the emergence and spread of H7N9 influenza virus in early stages of H7N9 outbreaks. This study was carried out in three cities, Wuxi, Suzhou, and Nanjing of Jiangsu Province, in the Yangtze Delta Region, which contained the first H7N9 human case and the major human cases (107 out of 137) during the first wave of H7N9 outbreaks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample collection and storage. From April 2 to April 28 of 2013, a total 422 swabs, including 356 pairs of oral-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs and 66 environmental samples, were collected (e.g., droppings, cage, and drainage water). Each swab was placed in an individual tube with cold sterile phosphate buffered saline containing 2000 U/ml penicillin and 1000 mg/ml streptomycin. These tubes were kept in an ice box before and during shipping to the laboratory and stored at −80 C. All manipulations of these samples were conducted under Biosafety Level 2 containment facilities.
RNA extraction and reverse transcription. Solid debris of the samples was pelleted by centrifugation at 4000 6 g for 5 min, and the supernatants were collected. For rapid determination of the presence of any H7 and H9 viruses, primers specific for these subtypes were designed, based on the alignment of H7 and H9 gene sequences. Total viral RNA was extracted using the AxyPrep Body Fluid Viral DNA/RNA Miniprep Kit (Axygen Inc., Hangzhou, China) from the supernatants of the samples according to the manufacturer's instructions. Complementary DNAs were synthesized with primer Uni12 (AGCAAAAGCAGG) using the avian myeloblastosis virus reverse transcriptase (TaKaRa Biotechnology, Dalian, China) for 1 hr at 42 C. PCR amplification was performed with specific primers for H7 and H9 using Ex Taq DNA Polymerase according to the manufacturer's protocol (TaKaRa Biotechnology). Primers were H7-1120F (59-AATGCACARGGAGGAGGAACT-39), H7-1620R (59-TGAYGCCCCGAAGCTAAACCA-39), H9-184F (59-CTYCACACAGAGCACAATGG-39), and H9-691R (59-GYCA-CACTTGTTGTTGTRTC-39).
All samples positive for H7 or H9 influenza A viruses were selected for genome sequencing. PCR was performed with influenza A virus specific primers for eight genes (8) using Ex Taq DNA Polymerase according to the manufacturer's protocol (TaKaRa Biotechnology) to sequence the full length genome. PCR products were purified using an AxyPrep DNA Gel Extraction Kit (Axygen Inc.) in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. The products were cloned into the pMD-18T vector (TaKaRa Biotechnology) and sequenced by Genscript Company, Nanjing, China. Sequence data were compiled and edited using the Lasergene sequence analysis software package (DNAStar, Inc., Madison, WI). The accession numbers of these genes were KT779566-KT779633.
Serologic assays. The birds from backyard poultry farms (BPFs) were vaccinated through intramuscular injection with inactivated H5N1 and H9N2 vaccines, which were supplied by the Chinese government. The serologic responses were measured using hemagglutinination inhibition assay. The hemagglutinination inhibition assays were performed according to World Organisation for Animal Health guidelines using 1% chicken red blood cells (2) .
Phylogenetic analysis and molecular characterization. The phylogenetic analyses were performed using maximum likelihood by the Genetic Algorithm for Rapid Likelihood Inference (24) and bootstrap resampling analyses using Phylogenetic Analysis Using Parsimony* 4.0 Beta (18) with a neighbor-joining method, as described earlier (19). In total 1410 HA sequences of the H7 subtypes of influenza A viruses were downloaded from Influenza Research Database (http:// www.fludb.org), and the phylogenetic analysis was used to identify those HA genes belonging to the Eurasian lineage for further analysis; 46 H7 sequences were included in the final uses in the phylogenetic trees.
Poultry trading routing survey. Along with influenza swab sample collection, a poultry trading survey was performed, including poultry source, climate, bird species, worker information, and farm or LPM size.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The onset of the first case of H7N9 human infection in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, was March 8, 2013 . From April 2 to April 28, we sampled five LPMs and 13 BPFs; the number of birds in each sampling location ranged from about 10 to 5000. The sampled LPMs and BPFs were located across three cities, Wuxi, Suzhou, and Nanjing, in the Yangtze Delta Region (Fig. 1 ). In total 422 samples were collected, including oral-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs from broiler chicken, hen, duck, goose, pigeon, quail, and environmental surfaces (swabs from droppings, cages, and water drainage). Twenty-two of the samples were influenza A virus positive as determined by M-gene based quantitative reverse transcriptase PCR (Table 1) . Genomic sequencing of these clinical samples showed that six were H7N9, nine were H9N2, four were coinfected with both H7N9 and H9N2, and three were unsubtyped influenza A viruses. Three samples with both H7N9 and H9N2 were from LPMs, and the other one sample coinfected with H7N9 and H9N2 virus was from one BPF ( Table 2) .
In order to identify the potential sources and transmission routes of the H7N9 outbreaks, we conducted a survey of the bird trading records of the LPMs and BPFs targeted in this study. The results of the survey showed that in addition to nearby cities in Jiangsu province, active trading occurred between three of the LPMs and at least eight locations in Anhui, Hebei, Henan, and Shandong (Fig. S1 ). Four of these areas, including three in Jiangsu and one in Henan, subsequently reported H7N9 human cases (Fig. 1) . These results indicate that trading was a likely route for virus transmission across these regions (Fig. 2) .
The genomes of 19 H7 and/or H9 were determined from positive samples. The HA and NA genes of the H7N9 viruses were similar to those of the H7N9 human isolates as well as other avian isolates in the region (3, 15) (Fig. 3A,B) . The internal genes, such as the polymerase subunit (PB1), polymerase subunit A (PA), neucleo protein (NP), and matrix protein (MP), of the sequenced viruses were, however, more diverse. For example, the PB1, PA, and NP gene segments belonged to two genetic clusters, and the MP gene segment to three clusters (Fig. S2A-F) . Our genetic analysis showed that the viruses isolated from humans were phylogenetically close to the viruses we identified in the LPMs (Figs. 3A,B and S2A-F) . In addition, the genes of the H9 viruses were genetically diverse, belonging to BJ94-like and G1-like genetic lineages (Fig. S3A,B) . Molecular characterization showed that key residues in the receptor binding sites of these H7N9 viruses were 213Q and 217L or 217G (213 and 217 correspond to 222 and 226 in H3 numbering, respectively; Table 3 ).
The BPF with H7N9 and H9N2 positive samples had about 100 free-ranging ducks and 80 free-ranging hens; all positives were found in the ducks. The ducks hunted food along the river and returned to the farm in the evening, giving them a higher chance of exposure to H7N9 during early disease outbreaks migratory birds (although it is unclear whether H7N9 viruses were preexisting in the migratory birds). The hens were vaccinated with H5N1 and H9N2 inactivated vaccines according to the avian influenza vaccination policies implemented by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. The 180 birds in this farm were culled following confirmation of the positive H7N9 results. Serologic evaluation through hemagglutinination inhibition assays showed that the duck population was H7N9 negative, demonstrating that the birds were probably H7N9 during early disease outbreaks infected with H7N9 not long before our sample collection. It is unclear whether the lack of H7N9 influenza A viruses among hens was due to vaccination, clearance of infection, resistance to infection, or exposure to low levels of viral loads in the environments or through shedding from other birds. In this study, 4 out of 22 isolates were mixed infections with H7N9 and H9N2 viruses; one mixed infection was from BPF, and the other three from LPMs. The results suggested the cocirculating of multiple subtypes of influenza A viruses in both BPFs and LPMs where we performed influenza surveillance. Of note, 9 of 15 subtyped single infection isolates were H9N2 virus, indicating the high prevalence of H9N2 virus in the region. The H9N2 virus has been endemic among domestic poultry in China since it was first isolated from chickens in China in 1994 (7, 14) . The internal genes of contemporary H9N2 viruses contributed to the emergence and genomic diversity of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses (6, 23) . Similarly, the mixed infection of H7N9 and H9N2 has contributed to the emergence of this novel H7N9 virus (3,21) and the virus's genomic diversity (11) , which could facilitate its rapid evolution.
Introduction of influenza A virus from wild birds to domestic poultry, especially domestic ducks, is frequently detected in China. Domestic ducks facilitate the interaction between genetic pools in wild birds and domestic poultry, maintain the wild bird-origin virus, and spread it to chickens (9) . More recently, the emergence of H10N8 viruses in Southern China highlights the threat brought by the current influenza ecosystem (16). Based on the findings in this study and early research, we propose a simple model to describe the emergence and spread of the novel H7N9 virus (Fig. 2) . Although LPMs could be one of the potential sources for emergence of H7N9 virus, we hypothesize that it would also be possible that the H7N9 viruses emerged in backyard birds through interactions with migratory waterfowl. It is likely that the H7N9 viruses could emerge in backyard birds through coinfections of two or more different viruses in the same birds, as is supported by this study detecting at least one mixed infection of H7N9 and H9N2 in one of 13 BPFs we sampled. The backyard birds then disseminated the H7N9 viruses into the LPMs, especially wholesale LPMs, through poultry trade. The wholesale markets served as the local source of infection, spreading virus to individual local LPMs. Owing to less frequent cleaning, the H7N9 viruses circulated in the LPMs, potentially leading to the generation of multiple genotypes through reassortment with other LPM viruses (12) . Birds and transportation vectors such as vehicles are the likely vectors that spread the viruses; a hypothesis supported by the temporal appearance and genetic similarity of H7N9 positive samples in our study and the reported human cases (Fig. 1) . Unfortunately, we were unable to collect avian samples in the regions supplying birds to the LPMs we sampled. Nevertheless, our model describes five major risk animal-influenza components, including LPMs, transportation vectors, BPFs, domestic poultry farms, and wild bird populations.
Among these risk components, LPMs are still the primary sources for human exposure and infection (19). Instead, wild bird populations could be the smallest risk component for public health because of the relatively fewest opportunities for human-wild bird interactions. On the other hand, the wild bird population component is not negligible because of the potential bidimensional transmission of influenza A viruses between wild birds and domestic poultry. In this study, one H7N9 isolate was identified in wild duck at LPM-C (Table 2) ; however, when and where this wild duck obtained the viral infection was not known. Nevertheless, bidimensional transmission of influenza A viruses between wild birds and domestic poultry is supported by the spread of clade 2.3.4.4 Gs/Gd/96-like H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, which emerged perhaps in China (5), from Southeast or Eastern Asia to Europe and North America (17).
Every year China produces approximately 10.75 billion broilers, 3 billion waterfowl, and 1.25 billion hens. In Jiangsu province, over 1 billion domestic poultries were produced in 2012, including approximately 600 million broilers, 160 million hens, 240 million ducks, and 60 million geese. Farm sizes range from 10 to over 50,000 birds, and there are many BPFs in this province. There are at least 1.99 million of BPFs with fewer than 500 birds, producing about 25% of the domestic poultry in Jiangsu. In Jiangsu's capital, Nanjing City, alone there are over 163,100 BPFs (Jiangsu Animal Disease Control Center, unpubl. data). Thousands of LPMs are located across Jiangsu, including those in suburbs of large cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, and Wuxi. The above model and prior experience suggest that two concurrent procedures in BPFs and LPMs could be implemented in order to minimize influenza emergence and transmission. In BPFs, better biosecurity and more effective vaccination procedures (e.g., H5N1 and H9N2), especially in waterfowl, should be implemented. In LPMs, the consistent implementation of cleaning procedures and maintenance of a clean market without live birds (e.g., 1 day/week) should be used to reduce viral loads in LPMs (11) . In order to reduce transmission of influenza A viruses from BPF-origin waterfowl to other bird species, these waterfowl should be separated from land-based bird species in both BPFs and LPMs. Longitudinal influenza surveillance should also be implemented primarily in BPFs and LPMs to monitor influenza infection dynamics and to separate abnormal influenza situations from normal situations, providing a risk assessment and early warning platform. Table 3 .
Molecular characterization of mutations at the receptor binding sites across H7N9 isolates. 
